Podcast Testi

Rome was now a protagonist of world politics, the world as they knew it in those times in the West, of course, and it could not avoid being involved in the often tormented and confusing events of the East. Greece and the Hellenistic kingdoms opened up to the Roman presence; for many members of the Roman ruling classes, Greece was at the origin of every culture, every wealth, every luxury and refinement. A world that attracted the greed of business people and merchants, a world from which new fearsome opponents could arise.

In the wake of its merchant fleet and the swords of Philip, Alexander and their generals, Greek civilization had penetrated everywhere, from Epirus to Asia Minor, from Palestine to Persia, from Egypt to India. And everywhere, the ruling and intellectual classes were now Greek or inspired themselves to Greece. Its philosophy, culture, literature, and science, transplanted in the territories of the empire founded by Alexander the Great, had created a new culture in all those countries.

But, politically, Greece was dead. When Rome, after the victory over Carthage, turned to it, it saw only a Milky Way of small nations, constantly at war with each other. Polybius, the great Greek-Roman historian, was not surprised that it took so little time to conquer them. In fact, Rome could have taken much less.

It all began with Philip V, King of Macedonia. Macedonia was the shadow of what it used to be with Alexander. But it was still the most solid nation in Greece, here cities were divided into two leagues, the Achean league and the Aetolian League, which, though they were at war with each other, stood united against him. 

In 216, Philip, hearing that Hannibal had crushed the Romans at Cannae, signed an alliance with him and asked the Greeks to help him destroy Rome, which could become dangerous for all. A conference was held in Naupacto, the Aetolians' delegate, speaking on behalf of all the cities that attended, asked Philip to put himself at the head of all the Greeks in that crusade. But, soon after, rumours began to circulate in Athens and other cities that Hannibal had given Philip the go for moving against Greeks in exchange for the help he had received. All of a sudden, trust vanished. And the Aetolian League asked Rome for help against Macedonia. Philip, fearing a possible alliance between the Greek Leagues and Rome, put his agreement with Hannibal aside and also made a pact with Rome, thus ending the 1st Macedonian war before it had even begun. In the last years of the 2^nd Punic War, Philip V had also allied with Antiochus III of Syria to take advantage of the young age of the King of Egypt and seize the Egyptian possessions in Asia Minor and Cyrenaica, present-day Turkey.

Romans were tired of conflicts, and although they were concerned about this secret pact, a real casus belli was still missing. And, indeed, the threat was just inexistent. Philip moved within his world; he had no intention of attacking Rome, nor did Antiochus. But, let’s put ourselves in the shoes of the Romans and, for this, I will resort to an analogy: there was a sort of “twin towers” syndrome, Rome was afraid it could be attacked in Italy. So, Philip’s movements at the limits of the Roman sphere of influence attracted Rome’s attention and ultimately turned it against the Macedonian.

After the defeat of the Carthaginians, it was Pergamus, Egypt and Rhodes who asked Rome for help against Philip, who was harassing them. They feared being crushed in the grip of the two allies, Philip and Antiochus, and urged the Romans to intervene. Rome had a long memory and remembered the behaviour of the Macedonian king at the time of Cannae, so after a short hesitation, it sent an army under the orders of the young Proconsul Titus Quinctius Flamininus. In 197, the Roman legions annihilated the Macedonian phalanxes at Cynocephales in Thessaly. The way to Greece was open.

But Flamininus was a strange guy. He came from a patrician family; he had studied in Taranto, had learned Greek there and was in love with Greek civilization. So, he did not kill Philip but instead put him back on the throne, despite protests from his Greek allies, who claimed that they had won at Cynocephales, not the Romans. Philip had to pay a war allowance, evacuate the territories conquered until then, limit his army, and above all, commit himself not to threaten in any way the independence of all the poleis, the cities, of Greece and Asia Minor.

Then, during the great Isthmic Games, when delegates from all over Greece gathered in Corinth, the barbarian Roman (and by the way, “barbarian” is a Greek word, meaning “stranger”, one who does not speak Greek, only ba ba ba, hence barbarian), Flamininus, an admirer of the glorious history of Greece, took the opportunity to present Rome as the protector and guarantor of the freedom of the Greeks: he proclaimed that all Greek peoples and cities were free, no longer subject to garrisons or tributes, and could govern themselves with their own laws.

The listeners, who expected the Macedonian yoke to be replaced by the Roman one, were stunned at such an unexpected promise of freedom. Sceptics in Athens and other cities did not have time to question Flamininus' honest intentions: unexpectedly, he withdrew his army from Greece right away.

Flamininus had made a grand, theatrical gesture, but this apparently liberal act had a subtler meaning: Romans were convinced they could control Greece from the outside.

The Greeks were a presumptuous, fickle and ungrateful people, always ready to change sides for their own convenience. The Greek world was cultured, remarkably civil, but with a tendency to forget great benefits in the name of even small wrongs. They were endemically scrappy, and if the Romans intervened heavily in their affairs as in other circumstances, imposing direct rule, they would find themselves embroiled in unending disputes, controversies, grievances and spites. To the Romans, the best solution was to look after them as babies: in political terms, control them remotely and leave them free to behave as they wanted, provided that they did not change the status quo.

But this state of calm did not last long. Right after the roar of applause that greeted Flamininus’ gesture faded, the first mutterings began to be heard. The numerous cities and populations, each complained about something, especially the Aetolians who had expected significant territorial compensation, being allies of Rome, and had been denied these compensations with a quibble by the Proconsul himself. Flamininus had also emancipated some cities of the Aetolian League and had carried away, to Rome, many works of art as a part of a conspicuous loot.

So, furious for what they considered an injustice, the Aetolians began to work against Rome. And they called Antiochus of Syria, the king of Babylon, to free them. Free them from what, we do not know, since Flamininus had left them freer than before, at least in theory.

Antiochus III, the Great, was the most powerful among the Hellenistic rulers. He was an energetic and skilled monarch; he ruled over an enormous territory, from Syria to India, and was preparing to re-establish his dominance in Asia Minor. Precisely for this reason, when the Romans defeated Philip, he did not come to his aid; he thought he could take advantage of the defeat of the Macedonian. And in 196, he began to threaten the Kingdom of Pergamus and the Greek cities occupied by Philip.

The following year, he welcomed Hannibal, who had fled Carthage so as not to end up in the hands of the Romans, who demanded his surrender. In Carthage, Hannibal had clashed with the aristocratic and merchant factions; he had fled the city at night to escape arrest and had sailed to Syria, to Antiochus's court. At that moment, Antiochus was hesitant between peace and war with Rome, and Hannibal had recommended him war and had become one of his military experts.

In 192, Antiochus landed in Thessaly, presenting himself as the defender of Greek independence: but he had only 10,000 men and six elephants, and the Achean League thought well to stay on the side of the strongest, that is, the Romans. Once again, the Romans skillfully exploited the divisions and jealousies among the Greeks: Hannibal had advised Antiochus to ally with Philip, to threaten Italy; instead, Antiochus’ move prompted Philip, who included Thessaly in his sphere of influence, to take sides against Antiochus.

In 191, the Romans landed in Greece, and Antiochus waited for them at the pass in front of which the march of Xerses and the Persians had been blocked by the Spartans 289 years before, the Thermopylae, the Hot Gates. But the Romans were more organized and tenacious than the Persians. They bypassed Antiochus’ fortifications and swooped behind Antiochus's army: of the 10,500 men, only about 500 managed to escape with the king and pass to Asia. The Romans had lost only 200 legionnaires.

In pursuit of Antiochus, the Romans landed in Asia. Antiochus gathered all the forces of his kingdom, from all over the East, for the decisive battle: there were Greek troops, the phalanx, Hellenic and Galatian mercenaries, the knights of Cappadocia sent by King Arate, the mounted archers from the Caspian regions, the Arabs on dromedaries, the armoured cavalry, the elephants and even a squad of mowing chariots, chariots with sickles leaning on the outside. All in all, about 70,000 men, against a Roman army about half that size, led by Lucius Cornelius Scipio, the African’s brother. Despite this, in 190, the Romans soundly defeated the Syrian army in Magnesia, close to nowadays Izmir, in Turkey, thanks to the tactical superiority of the legions over the Macedonian-derived phalanxes.

Antiochus had to abandon all his possessions in Asia Minor, pay compensation, give up much of the fleet and all his war elephants. The territories he evacuated were transferred, some to the kingdom of Pergamus and some to Rhodes. The Aetolians were not punished as severely as they expected: they were still helpful as an obstacle to the expansion of the kingdom of Macedonia.

This time the Romans, among other conditions, imposed the handover of Hannibal. Once again, he fled: first to Crete, then to Bithynia (Northern Turkey). The Romans gave him no respite, and a few years later, they asked the King of Bithynia to hand Hannibal over. The old general preferred death to capture; he poisoned himself. He was 67. A few months later, his winner and admirer Publius Cornelius Scipio, “the African”, would follow him to the grave. It was 183 BC.

Rome did not occupy any territory nor constitute any province: where political entities were developed, and their populations could not simply be absorbed, the Romans merely exploited them economically, controlling their foreign policy, to prevent them from taking dangerous initiatives. On the other side, the attitude towards less developed populations was different: in this case, Rome almost always annexed their lands and assigned them to its citizens as agricultural lots, as it happened in northern Italy, or exploited their mineral resources, for instance in Spain.

In Macedonia, first Philip V, then his son Perseus patiently started to rebuild the kingdom, increasing the exploitation of gold mines, also to recreate a strong army. But, any of these armies could not rival the Roman ones, for one simple reason: while the Romans could enlist legions after legions of citizen-soldiers, as was the case after each of the catastrophic defeats during the Punic wars, on the contrary, the armies of the Hellenistic kingdoms, including Macedonia, mainly relied on mercenaries, who were expensive and difficult to recruit, and also ready to sell themselves to the highest bidder.

Perseus was cautious to avoid any initiative that Rome could consider hostile. But in 172, the King of Pergamus Eumenes, who saw Perseus as a possible rival, appeared before the Senate in person, accusing Perseus of carrying out war preparations.

The Senate did not give Perseus' ambassadors the chance to justify their ruler; the poleis had finally realized that Rome did not want to free them, only wanted to exploit them, and senators feared that the anti-Roman sentiments that were growing throughout Greece could come together around Perseus. Thus, in 171 BC, Rome declared war, the Third Macedonian War, and at Pydna, in 168, a Roman army led by Aemilius Paulus, son of the fallen consul at Cannae, defeated the Macedonians. Perseus was translated to Rome in chains to adorn the winner's chariot.

The Macedonian kingdom was divided into four independent republics, each with its currency; the people of one republic could not even marry any citizen of the other republics or own lands outside their district: Macedonia was not annexed but was fragmented not only politically but also economically and socially. Never has there been a more explicit demonstration of the principle “divide et impera”, divide and rule.

A few years later, however, in 148, following a revolt, the Romans transformed Macedonia into a province. The policy of hegemony without direct occupation was over: from now on, Rome more and more annexed the territories instead of controlling them from the outside. By now, the Romans had overcome the inferiority complex towards Greece and were moving back to their traditional policy of occupation and romanization.

But not even this time, the turbulent Greeks learnt from the lessons they had received. A few years later, new nationalist classes came to power in the various cities. The Achean League was reconstituted and, when it learned that Rome was engaged in the 3rd war against Carthage in 149, it called all of Greece for liberation. But it was too late, now Rome could safely fight a war on two fronts.

While Scipio Aemilianus with an army embarked for Africa, the other consul Mummius fell on Corinth, one of the most hostile cities, besieged it, conquered it, killed all its men, enslaved all its women and, after embarking everything that could be transported to Rome, he set the city on fire. The destruction of Corinth aimed not only at crushing any rebellion from the other Greek cities but also at eliminating a competitor for Roman and Italian merchants, as Corinth was a flourishing commercial centre in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Greece and Macedonia were united into one province under a Roman governor, except Athens and Sparta, which were granted some autonomy. Greece had finally found its peace: unfortunately, it was the peace of the cemetery.

The victorious generals returned from the East with huge loots: slaves, metals and precious textiles, but also statues and paintings that they exhibited during the triumphs. These showed the Romans the peaks that Hellenistic art had reached. Rome was about to become a splendid Museum of Greek Art. Even the troops who had lived for years in the East brought back new objects, new luxury, far from the Roman tradition of sobriety and austerity.

Greek wise men also came to the Urbs, attracted by the job opportunities offered by the new rulers of the Mediterranean: doctors, masters of literature, philosophers. Many Roman aristocrats already knew the Greek language, and the ones who did not, learnt it; the generals sent to the East spoke fluently with kings and in front of city assemblies. The Roman ruling class was convinced of the superiority of the Greek culture over the Roman one and fully absorbed it without repudiating its political and military commitment. See, for example, Scipio Africanus, who was very sensitive to Greek culture, and Titus Quinctius Flamininus, who granted freedom to the Greek cities. Also, the cultural preparation required to govern the extensive territories that the Republic had conquered was increasingly complex.

However, within the Roman aristocracy, some looked with fear and hostility at the growing presence of Greeks and things from Greece in Roman society: this happened in particular when they seemed to menace the foundations and stability of the pre-existing social order that the Romans defined by the expression "mos maiorum", the behaviour of the ancestors.

On various occasions during the 2nd century, the contrast between the two tendencies was harsh, both in terms of political confrontation and cultural controversy. The ideal of the traditionalists was the Roman peasant, citizen and soldier at the same time. But that ideal was now gone, no possibility to retrieve it. As a result of the conquests and of the great influx of money, Rome was more and more active in the trade circuits of the East, and Roman and Italian merchants swarmed in the Mediterranean and conditioned even the foreign policy of the Republic. The very disappearance of the traditional figure of the soldier-farmer, an unexpected consequence of the victories of Rome, will provoke the final crisis of the Republic at the apogee of its power.

The Battle of Cannae was the most severe disaster suffered by the Romans in the Punic Wars. It seemed that Hannibal could realize his strategic plan, at least in part. Some cities in Puglia and Campania abandoned Rome and passed to Hannibal. Large groups of populations in Southern Italy rebelled against the Romans; in Campania and Magna Graecia, the maritime cities remained loyal to Rome, as they feared the damage that would come from Carthaginian supremacy in Italy. But Capua, the largest centre in Southern Italy, where the integration with Rome seemed already under way, passed to Hannibal.

The Romans feared that Hannibal would march over the city. But Hannibal did not show up, and even today, you may wonder why he did not dare to. He probably knew that he could never conquer the city with his army; it was not his final goal when he decided to come to Italy. He wanted to force Rome to peace, possibly incorporating it into a system of alliances led by Carthage.

However, instead of exploiting his enormous success in Cannae, Hannibal decided to rest, sent home non-Roman prisoners, and offered Rome to return Roman prisoners for a small compensation. But the Senate proudly refused.

The leaders of the popular faction in Rome, led by Quintus Fabius Maximus, took control of the war, and from this moment on, they managed to fight it with the very slow, painful methods, expensive in terms of human lives and material sacrifices, dictated by their leader, the “Cunctator”.

Rome’s ties with her allies in Central Italy, with their representatives sitting in large numbers in the Senate of Rome, fortunately these ties held. Despite the defeat, all the Roman and Latin colonies of Southern Italy continued to remain closed in their fortifications and hinder the movements of Hannibal's army. In Sicily, the city of Syracuse first passed on the side of the Carthaginians; the faction favourable to the Romans returned to power, until Hannibal again managed to recapture the city. However, all in all, the allies who remained faithful and the Roman and Latin colonies which resisted still ensured the Romans the domination of most of the Italian peninsula.

In the following year, Rome could organize a new army of 200,000 men. When it was ready, they gave a part to consul Marcellus to restore order in Sicily and break the resistance of Syracuse down; part of it was held in Rome to defend the city; another part, led by the two elder Scipios, was sent to Spain against Hannibal's brother, Hasdrubal.

Three years passed without any significant clash, and in the year 211 Hannibal attempted what he had not tried five years earlier in the aftermath of Cannae: he presented himself before the walls of Rome. He did not do so to assault and conquer it but in an attempt to loosen the grip that the Roman armies had tightened around the city of Capua. But Romans were unimpressed; they knew the menace was not serious, they remained resolute within their walls while outside in Central Italy, up to 12 legions were chasing Hannibal, a contingent enormously superior to Hannibal’s army. Rome’s armies controlled him without ever offering him a chance to start a battle, he managed to achieve some victories, but he could not prevent the Romans from making scorched earth among his allies. And at the end, Hannibal retreated towards Capua.

The year 211 was also crucial for what happened away from Italy. The two Scipios, Publius and Gnaeus, who commanded the armies in Spain, were defeated separately and fell in combat. It was necessary to replace them in command of the troops. And here comes the great leader who was to avenge all the humiliations of Rome. To replace the 2 Scipios, the Senate sent to Spain their respective son and nephew, Publius Cornelius, only 24 years old, the veteran of Ticino and Cannae.

At the time of the battle of Ticino, Scipio was a young man barely 17 years old, attached to the army, although he was not old enough to fight in the legions. One and a half year later, on the battlefield of Cannae, he was a young 19-year-old military tribune probably commanding a cavalry unit and fighting under consul Lucius Emilius Paulus. Publius Cornelius was a brave soldier and an excellent commander. He was eloquent; he had a great name, he was brave, he was famous. He did not undertake anything, either public or private, without first asking permission from the gods, praying in the temple. His fellow citizens were convinced the gods recommended him. His model was not his father, but that same Carthingnian general who had won all the battles with Rome. Scipio dreamed of matching and even surpassing him in military glory, of confronting him as the qualifying act of his career and life.

As soon as he arrived in Spain for his command, he set out to attempt a feat that seemed impossible: Nova Carthago's conquest. Nova Carthago was the name given to it by the Romans, the Punics called it Carta Dash, i.e. new city, the same name of the motherland. The city stood on a narrow isthmus, on an inland lagoon connected to the sea, apparently impregnable so that the Punics had a garrison of 1000 men only. They guarded the hostages of the Iberian tribes allied to Carthage and the silver extracted from the nearby mining district. To conquer the city, soldiers should cross the lagoon, and water was so deep that they should do it by swimming, impossible for men weighed down by armour, helmet and weapons. Scipio’s extremely ambitious, strategically brilliant project will allow the Romans to take the city practically on the first assault and during the day.

Scipio was a skilled strategist, and in his plans, he carefully evaluated all variables, geophysical and atmospheric. He had learned from some local fishermen that the inland lagoon could be waded in particular wind and sea conditions: that is, with a specific land wind blowing and the low tide, the lagoon emptied and could be crossed on foot. Scipio was also a skilled connoisseur of the human soul and wanted to create a halo of legend around his figure: on the eve of the enterprise, he summoned his soldiers and told them that Neptune, the god of the sea, had just appeared to him in a dream and promised to help him by lowering the level of the pond.

Scipio had the city attacked by land and sea and, while the bulk of the legions kept the defenders engaged on the side of the isthmus, as the waters flowed towards the open sea, 500 Romans with stairs ran through the lagoon from the west and climbed the walls.

At the same time, the Romans managed to get to the top of the fortifications from the seaside. The city could not resist and fell, with all its enormous riches, with its war machines, with 63 cargo ships, many of them with holds still full of the gold and silver accumulated by the Barca family, Hannibal's family.

It was a masterstroke. And Publius was even more skilled when he freed the Iberian hostages held by the Carthaginians; some of them, the most illustrious, he sent them back to their homes with gifts. In essence, he tried to make friends with the local peoples. His luck, his glory and his generosity attracted the Spaniards, who will support him from now on.

Scipio spent the rest of the year 210 and all of 209 organizing and training his army.

The following year, in 208, in the Battle of Baecula, his legions defeated a Carthaginian army led by Hasdrubal Barca, Hannibal’s brother. However, Hasdrubal avoided complete defeat and headed towards Italy with the remainder of his army to rejoin with his brother, and Scipio could not stop him.

Two years later, in 206, Scipio achieved his last major victory in the Iberian Peninsula against the last Carthaginian army in the south near present-day Alcalá del Río. Carthaginian commanders Hasdrubal and Mago fled while their troops were massacred. In only five years, the Roman general had forced the Carthaginians out of Spain; Rome now ruled Iberia, and Scipio was already thinking about his next move: as Hannibal had brought war on the Italian soil, he would do the same, this time in Africa.

Before returning to Italy, Publius met with Massinissa, the Prince of Numidians. He had already shown his generosity by releasing Massiva, Massinissa’s young nephew. Massinissa had seen how the Romans had driven the Carthaginians out of Spain in a few years; he understood that the wind had changed and accepted the offer of an alliance. Scipio had managed to take one of their most precious allies away from the Carthaginians, the leader of the famous Numidian cavalry, which the Romans feared so much, another masterstroke; he was already laying the foundations for his expedition to Africa.

Through France and the Alps, Hasdrubal had managed to escape with his army in his brother's footsteps. But the Romans were waiting for him. One army was sent to keep Hannibal under surveillance, but the Carthaginian did not move because he was unaware of anything. Another army waited for Hasdrubal on the river Metaurus near Senigallia and defeated it. It is said that the general's head was severed from the body and thrown into Hannibal's camp.

Now everything was turning against the Carthaginian general. The Italian cities which had rebelled but were afraid of Rome sympathised but did not help him. Carthage had sent him 100 ships loaded with reinforcements, but 80 had sunk off the coast of Sardinia.

After his return to Rome, Scipio was enormously popular and in 205 was elected consul, and he proposed to bring the war to Africa. But, notwithstanding his fame and successes, not everybody in Rome backed his plan, particularly among aristocrats.

At the end of a complex negotiation, the two sides found a compromise: the Consul could have Sicily as a province and was allowed to bring the war to Africa from there, but he could not make additional levers and could not collect ships and money on behalf of the Res Publica for a possible expedition across the sea; he could only use the troops not employed against Hannibal, essentially the so-called legiones Cannaenses, the legions that had been located in Sicily after their defeat in Cannae. He could also get contributions from citizens and allies, but only voluntarily. A powerful cloak on Scipio.

The so-called “Legiones Cannaenses” were stationed in Sicily; their soldiers were confined there as a punishment for losing the battle of Cannae and other minor battles, soldiers who continued to be kept away from Italy, covered in infamy and humiliated: they could not be discharged, they did not receive licenses, they did not receive spares, they could not stay in the city even during the winter. 10,000 men, deemed infamous by the Roman state.

Scipio had essentially obtained waste troops, and he risked failure. He appealed to private citizens and allies and received unexpected support: almost all central and northern Italy cities spared from the war agreed to help him: money, supplies, weapons, troops came, mainly from those Etruscan states that were traditionally linked to his family.

And in 204, he sailed towards the African coast with this new, powerful army, 23.500 infantrymen and 2500 cavalrymen. For Carthage, now the war from offensive had turned into defensive, and the Punic Senate quickly summoned Hannibal to defend it.

In the year 203, after pretending to enter into peace negotiations, Scipio annihilated 2 Carthaginian armies with a ruse and later defeated a third. Carthage was tired of the war, it began to turn its back on Hannibal's party,  the end of the conflict was not in sight, the enemy had come to camp not far from the city, on its Gulf, and Carthage was now under pressure, most of the population now hoped only for the return of the two armies that still fought in Italy.

Hannibal landed in Africa with his army of veterans. At the same time, another army of mercenaries previously stationed in Northern Italy joined him, and the two armies headed towards the plain of Zama, about 50 miles south of Carthage. Now Hannibal was in command of an imposing force, bigger than the Roman one: about 40,000 men with 4000 cavalrymen and 80 elephants: 15,000 veterans of Italy, legendary but worn out, 11,000 unruly Iberian mercenaries and 10,000 citizens of Carthage, who would need long training.

The army in front of him was smaller but more homogeneous, entirely composed of veterans with skyrocketing morale for recent successes; it also included the powerful Numidian cavalry, which had granted Hannibal many victories. Moreover, it was led by a general who was far superior to all the Roman commanders that Hannibal had faced in Italy, a general who had not only assimilated but even perfected the tactics elaborated by Hannibal himself.

Fate had set the two greatest generals of the time in front of each other. And Roman historians report that Hannibal asked for a meeting before the decisive battle, and Scipio agreed. Hannibal tried to negotiate, but he was probably also curious to see the young rival; he had heard so many stories about him. But it was too late for negotiation, and on the other hand, Publius did not accept conditions: he was finally in front of his opponent, he was convinced that he could win, and he wanted the battle.

For the first time in his life, Hannibal, instead of taking the initiative, had to suffer his opponent's initiative, who used the same pincer technique that the Carthaginian had perfected in many battles. At the end of the fight, 20,000 Carthaginians laid on the ground. Hannibal got on a horse and galloped towards Carthage.

The Romans had won the war, but Scipio was generous. He asked for the fleet and recently conquered territories to be handed over and a war indemnity, but not for Hannibal's life or imprisonment. In 201, he returned to Rome and celebrated a grand triumph, and he took the nickname “Africanus”, the African.

Thus ended the Second Punic War.  

The Second Punic War decided the fate of the Mediterranean and Western Europe for centuries. Rome annexed Spain and became the dominant power over the sea, and increased its wealth immensely. However, the war took its toll: in all, 300,000 men had been killed, they were needed for farming and the army. Four hundred cities had been destroyed, half of the farms looted, especially in southern Italy.

However, from here, Rome will take a new push to head eastwards: in the following years, it will conquer Greece and Syria, shifting the centre of gravity of the Republic towards the East.

And, what about Hannibal? His war on Rome would continue for another 18 years, until its end far from Carthage, on the shores of the Black Sea. But that’s another story.

In the last episode, we left you with the victory of the Romans over Pyrrhus. Now Rome dominates the Italian peninsula; only Carthage can rival it in Western Mediterranean. The clash between the maritime empire of Carthage and the new power of Rome, which needs complete control of the surrounding seas, is inevitable. Their duel will drag on for over a century.

Carthage as Rome had a legend at the origin of its story. According to it, it was founded by Dido, daughter of the Phoenician king of Tyre. Her brother had killed her husband, and she had fled with a group of followers and had sailed west. They had landed near Tunis, and she had said: "here we will build our new city". In fact, they called it so, new city; in their language, it was Carta Dash, which the Romans then translated into Carthago. That's the legend. And there’s a second part, narrated by the poet Vergilius in the Aeneid: Aenea, on the way to Lazio, stopped close to Carthage and was brought to the Queen. She fell in love with the hero, but he left to fulfil his mission (the foundation of Rome, though at the time he did not know he had one), and Dido, before killing herself, cursed him and his offspring.

You can see, it was all set for a fight to the death.  

In reality, the city was founded by the Phoenicians, great merchants and navigators who went up and down across the Mediterranean with their boats, selling and buying a little bit of everything. The Phoenicians were originally from the coastal regions of the eastern Mediterranean (present-day Lebanon). They founded colonies on the northern coasts of Africa, in Spain, Sicily, Sardinia.

The term Phoenician comes from the Greek phòiniks meaning "red". This name is linked to the most precious and important commodity that the Phoenicians exported to Greece and throughout the Mediterranean: purple, a special pigment that was extracted from molluscs, that Phoenicians had learned to use very early on an industrial scale to dye fabrics. The long and complex extraction process of this substance meant that purple-treated fabrics were costly, and their use was long associated with the idea of royalty.

One of the most important legacies of the Phoenicians is the alphabet. Unlike Egypt, where hieroglyphics were used, Phoenicians were the first to adopt an alphabetic writing system, consisting of a limited number of signs, each of which served to designate a sound. Therefore, in Phoenician, a word was generally composed of several signs, just as in modern languages.

Carthage was the wealthiest Phoenician colony and was one of the richest cities in the Mediterranean: it had more than 200,000 inhabitants, who did not live in huts as in Rome, but in houses up to 12 floors. Nobles and great merchants had villas with gardens and swimming pools, and the city boasted great baths. The port had 220 piers. As in Rome, the supreme body was the Senate, also composed of 300 members. Carthage did not count very much on the army because its African neighbours did not worry her. On the sea, however, it was the strongest naval power of that time. In peacetime, its fleet had 500 quinqueremes (5 rows ships), somewhat the battleships of the time; in all the ravines of the Spanish and French coasts, the Carthaginians had construction sites, supply warehouses and informants.

Conquering southern Italy, Rome had invaded Carthage’s sphere of influence, and so the two powers began a confrontation. The step towards war was short: between 264 and 242, Rome and Carthage fought the 1st Punic war, a mostly naval war.

But, you may wonder, the Romans did not have a fleet. It is true, but after the first defeats, they set up, in a short time, a fleet of 120 quinqueremes and equipped them with so-called "crows", they were mobile walkways with hooks that were hoisted on the deck and attached themselves to enemy ships and prevented manoeuvring. Roman soldiers could assault enemy ships walking on these walkways, thus transforming the naval battle into a sort of land battle. With this equipment, Romans won several naval battles, and in 241, in the final clash between the two exhausted rivals, they defeated and destroyed the last Carthaginian ships. To achieve peace, the Carthaginians had to surrender Sicily and were compelled to pay a heavy indemnity.

After the war in the south, the Roman expansion turned north, towards the fertile lands of the Po Valley, inhabited by the Gauls. When, in 226, they dared to attempt yet another raid in central Italy, the Romans were prepared; in three years, the Po Valley was subjugated, except for the territory of the Veneti, who had always been allies of the Romans. They called this new rich province Cisalpine Gaul, occupied the capital Mediolanum, i.e. Milan and founded two strong colonies, Cremona and Piacenza.

In Carthage, the leader of the army and head of the most powerful family, Amilcare, who had already fought the Romans in Sicily in the 1st Punic war, was preparing his revenge. He was allowed by the Senate to move to Spain with the remainder of the army. Before leaving, he led his three sons, Hannibal, Hasdrubal and Mago, to the temple and made them swear before the altar that they would avenge Carthage one day. Within a few years, Amilcare expanded the possessions of Carthage until Spain became its main colony. The control of the richest silver mines in the ancient world allowed Carthage to pay the war allowance to Rome, and at the same time, Amilcare could rearm a mighty army.

Amilcare died in Spain, and his son-in-law Hasdrubal succeeded him at the head of the army for eight years. When he, in turn, died, the soldiers hailed Amilcare's son Hannibal as their commander in chief. He was only 26 years old: he would become the most famous general of antiquity.

Before his father took him to Spain, Hannibal had received an excellent education. He knew history, the Greek and Latin languages, he was an admirer of Alexander the Great and had studied his strategies and tactics, and from Amilcare's tales, he had come up with a relatively clear idea of Rome, its strengths and weaknesses; he was convinced that Rome was invincible far from Italy, due to her strong ties with Italic allies, but a defeat in Italy would take them away from her. Hence, war should be fought on Italian soil.

He was robust, frugal, clever and courageous. The Roman historian Livy says that he was the first to enter the battle and the last to leave. But he also insists on his greed, cruelty and lack of scruples. His soldiers loved him and believed in him blindly. He dressed like them, ate with them and shared all their inconveniences.

In 218, he assaulted the city of Saguntum. By the time of Hasdrubal, Rome had recognized the territories south of the river Ebro as an area of Carthaginian influence. In turn, Carthaginians would not expand north of the river. Saguntum was south of the river but, being an ally of Rome, was protected by her. Hannibal knew that, by assaulting Saguntum, Rome would react, and that’s the casus belli he was looking for. He spent eight months around the walls of Sagunto before conquering it; then, when the Romans ordered him to retreat, he crossed the river Ebro and headed for Italy with 50,000 infantrymen, 9000 cavalrymen and 30 elephants.

Crossing the Pyrenees and bypassing Marseille, he began the climb to the Alps, avoiding a Roman army sent to block his way to the coast.

We do not know where he passed exactly: some say through St. Bernard, some Monginevro. However, around the beginning of September 218, he reached the summit; the descent was even more difficult, especially for elephants. Eventually, he arrived in the Po Valley with only 26,000 men, less than half of those who had left. But here, the Gauls welcomed him, supplied him with food and allied with him, slaughtering the Romans in Cremona and Piacenza.

The Senate realized that this second war was much more dangerous than the first. It called to arms 300,000 infantrymen and 14,000 cavalrymen and entrusted part of them to the first of the many Scipios we’ll encounter, later on, Publius Cornelius. He faced Hannibal on the Ticino River and lost the battle. He would have died if it was not for his son, who came to his rescue and saved him. We’ll meet him again, many years later. It was October 218 B.C.

After two months, another army was sent to face Hannibal and intercepted him on the Trebbia river. The army was led by the two consuls, Scipio and Sempronius; Sempronius was eager to fight, while Scipio was more prudent after the defeat on the Ticino river. Now, to let you understand Hannibal’s cunning, let me tell you something about this battle (it’s the only one I am going to describe, I promise). 

The Romans had 40,000 men and the Carthaginians about 30,000 soldiers. The two armies were more or less of equal strength, but with a big difference: Hannibal had 10,000 cavalrymen against less than 5,000 roman cavalrymen.

The two Roman generals did not agree on the strategy to follow: Scipio preferred to wait and study his enemy, Sempronius wanted to attack immediately. The two generals led the army every other day.

The night before the battle, December 24th, the temperature was below 0°C, and it rained heavily. Before the sun rose on the 25th, Hannibal ordered that all men be fed and keep warm around the fires; he also ordered them to smear their bodies with oil to fight the cold and rain and keep muscles flexible. Also, he told his brother Mago, the head of the cavalry, to choose 1,000 infantrymen and 1,000 cavalrymen, lead them to a nearby islet, remain hidden there in the bushes, and wait for his signal.

In the morning, Hannibal ordered a few hundred cavalrymen to descend into the river, cross it, climb to the opposite bank and harass the Romans, making a big noise. Sempronius was the commander in chief that day. Could he tolerate this kind of mockery? No way! He decided to send his cavalry out on the field. The Carthaginians then began to retreat to the river, but slowly. Sempronius, feeling that the situation turned in his favour, sent out the light infantry. The more the Carthaginians withdrew, the more the Romans came out of their camp to support the front line.

To press the enemy, Roman infantrymen had entered the river with water at chest level. Unlike the Carthaginians, Romans were unprepared for this situation: cold, without having eaten, their hands numb. Several were carried away by the strong current; others drowned. However, the bulk of the front line arrived on the other side. To press the enemy even more and perhaps think of giving him the final strike, Sempronius ordered the other half of the troops to move to the opposite shore.

So, the trap was complete. Now, Hannibal ordered his men to advance towards the river. They were fed, dry and fresh; the enemy was empty-bellied, wet and tired. The Carthaginian cavalry hit the wings of the Romans. At the centre of the battle, the Roman formation was still well united. Finally, Hannibal gave the signal to Mago and his 2,000 men, you remember, to attack. They charged the Roman army in the back. Romans were surrounded. In a last desperate effort, 10,000 managed to break out finally and head towards Piacenza, finding refuge within the walls. The Carthaginians were also tired and wet by the persistent rain, could not pursue the Romans and returned to their camp.

Another eight months passed, with Hannibal heading south. Now consul Flaminius with 30,000 men, moved to meet Hannibal’s army. Despite the two battles lost by his predecessors, he was so sure to win that he had taken a load of chains with him to put them at the feet of the prisoners. Hannibal seemed to want to avoid the battle, but instead, he was preparing another trap. In fact, with a skilful game of patrols and skirmishes, he attracted the enemy to a plain on the northern shores of Lake Trasimeno, in Umbria, surrounded by hills of woods where he had hidden his cavalry. The Romans, eager to reach him and attack, moved early in the morning when the area was shrouded in thick fog, without avantgarde. And here they were surrounded, with no way out. Almost no one remained alive, not even the Consul.

Now, Hannibal was getting closer to Rome, but for the time being, the strategy behind his military victories, to separate Rome from her allies, was not working. In Tuscany and Umbria, the cities closed in front of his army, and he did not know how to resupply. Hannibal even sent non-Roman prisoners home, but in vain, Italy was backing Rome. And all he could do was to divert to the Adriatic Sea in search of more hospitable lands. After three consecutive battles, his soldiers were tired, and he himself suffered from an infection that had made him blind in one eye. Now that they were moving away from their regions, the Gallic allies began to desert; he asked Carthage for reinforcements, but the Senate refused. So, he resumed his march southwards, but now there was a true strategist, Quintus Fabius Maximus, in front of him.

Romans had resorted to appointing a “dictator”, and Fabius was now the commander in chief with unlimited military powers, though only for a limited time. He inaugurated a new strategy: inaction. For this, he will be known as "cunctator". He set up skirmishes and ambushes, but he did not let himself be drawn into battle. He waited for the difficulties, the hunger, the weariness to work against the enemy, who was in despair. His strategy was working, but his fellow citizens could not stand to stay inactive and see Hannibal devastate the territories of Central and Southern Italy, with Rome’s allies turning to the Carthaginian for fear of being burnt down. They wanted a victory and grew tired too soon.

With the new year came the new Consuls, Varro and Paulus, who wanted what their voters wanted, a quick success. They led 80,000 infantrymen and 6,000 cavalrymen against Hannibal who, despite having only 20,000 veterans, 15,000 Gauls and 10,000 cavalrymen, drew a sigh of relief. He feared only Fabius Maximus. It was a huge army, but also difficult to direct: in ancient times, armies over 50,000 men were almost impossible to manoeuvre, and in addition to that, the Romans, being not one but two consular armies together, alternated the commander every day, one day Varro and one day Paulus.

The battle, the biggest of antiquity, took place in Cannae, in Puglia, not far from Barletta, on August 2nd, 216, BC. Hannibal, as usual, attracted the enemy to flat ground, suitable for the game of his cavalry. Then he put the Gauls in the centre, he was sure they would retreat soon, and so they did, but slowly, they managed to contain the fury and impetuosity of the legions. Varro's troops slowly threw themselves into the hole, and Hannibal's cavalry on the wings closed around them. The other consul, Paulus, who prudently had suggested not to engage, fought bravely and fell. At the end of the day, 50,000 Romans, including 80 senators, laid on the ground, and 19,000 were taken prisoners. Only 15.000 could escape, among them the consul Varro.
The Carthaginian lost only 6,000 Gauls, 1,500 Hispanics and Africans, and only 200 cavalrymen. He had achieved the most brilliant victory of his career as a general, which consecrated him as one of the greatest military leaders of all time. The battle of Cannae remains a never topped example of military strategy and is studied in all military schools in the world, many generals in WWII and even in recent wars took inspiration from his manoeuvres of 2,000 years ago.

Cannae was Hannibal’s masterpiece. But it would also be his last; with this battle, the secret of his success, the superiority of his cavalry, was uncovered, and after so many battles lost, the Romans will never be retaken by surprise.

From the year 509 BC, when the Republic was founded, all the monuments that the Romans raised anywhere bore the acronym SPQR, meaning Senatus Populus-Que Romanus, that is, the Senate and the Roman people.

We've talked about the Senate before. But what about the people? The people did not correspond at all to what we mean today by this word. In those distant days, it did not include all citizens but only two orders, that is, two social classes: the “patricii” and the “equites”. The “patricii”, the aristocrats, were the descendants of the Patres, that is, the founders of the city, and were also the most prominent landowners. They formed the Senate, which was accessible only to the members of their families, each of them bearing the name of the ancestor who founded it. In fact, Julius, Valerius, Aemilius are family names.

With King Tarquinius Priscus, merchants and artisans had also settled in the city, but the Patricians kept them at a distance: these were called Plebeians. Under King Servius Tullius, this class had already differentiated itself: on the one hand, those who devoted themselves to activities of pure subsistence, herding, agriculture and in general all manual jobs; on the other, a large bourgeoisie, or middle class, quite numerous and very strong financially. They called themselves the Equites, the cavalrymen, and outnumbered the Patricians.

With the advent of the Republic, the Patricians understood that they could not be alone against all others, and so they allied with the Equites. They co-opted the Equites, that is, they allowed them to the Senate. But even on the day when the eques finally managed to become a senator, he was not welcomed as a “pater”, that is, patrician, but as a conscriptus; the assembly was in fact made up of “patres et conscripti”.

After the Republic was founded, the Consulate came as a consequence: 2 consuls with the imperium, the supreme military command and the powers to convene the Senate, administer justice, chair the rallies. It was two because they should control each other, which will last until the empire is established. In wartime, they led the army, each consul half of it. The Consuls took office on March 15, the Ides of March, and ruled for one year; they were also religious leaders and directed the State’s most important rites.

The richer a citizen was, the more taxes he had to pay, the more years he should serve in the army. For those who wanted to start a public career, the minimum in the military was ten years, and therefore only the rich could practically undertake it because only they could spend so much time away from the farm or the shop. But even if you wanted to exercise your political rights first and then your voting rights, you should have been a soldier because only then you could take part in the Comitia Centuriata, the highest legislative body in the state.

The young man who survived ten years of military life could embark on a political career that went step by step; it was wholly elective and subject to all sorts of precautions. The Comitia Centuriata examined the nominations and awarded the appointments, which were all multiple: 2 Consuls, 2 to 6 Ediles, civil magistrates, 2 to 8 Quaestores, the officials who supervised the state treasury and made audits.

The Comitia Centuriata was not a permanent Assembly; it met at the call of a Consul or a Tribune and could not issue laws by itself but only vote the magistrate's proposals by a majority yes or no.

The Senate met in the Curia in front of the Forum at the Consul's request, who presided over the assembly. Its decisions did not have the force of law; they were only a suggestion to the magistrates, but a magistrate would seldom bring before the Comitia a proposal that had not received the prior approval of the Senate. When a crisis was imminent, the Senate resorted to a special emergency decree, the "Senatus Consultum Ultimum", by which it decided irrevocably; so, the Senate was actually the ultimate ruler of the State. It could appoint a “dictator” for six months or a year during a crisis, investing him with full powers.

As I said before, the two Consuls led the army. In the Republican period before the Punic Wars, there were two armies, one consular army for each consul. If the army was just one, as was the case in Cannae, the consuls alternated daily. Often, they, or the dictator and his lieutenant, were personal and political rivals, which obviously did not favour the unity of command. From this, some of the worst defeats of the Romans will originate.

Another weakness of this system was that, while everyone had some military experience, the Consuls often did not have a command experience. Many times, they had no competence at all as generals and, if armies won, it was not thanks to them; perhaps the greatest mistake of the Romans of those times was to change commander every year, depriving him of command just when he was beginning to learn the art of war.

Generally speaking, within the Roman political system, and the military hierarchy was an extension of it, the principle of preventing an individual from gaining overwhelming power was deeply rooted: for example, in the military, there were two centurions for each platoon, three prefects for each cavalry wing and six tribunes, that is colonels, for each legion. From a military point of view, the consular system was also weak because every time the legions were discharged and then a new army needed to be formed; the whole process would restart from scratch.

The defence of the state was considered, at least by the Senate, as a duty, a responsibility and a privilege; but, besides aristocracy, most citizens were, in principle, farmers, they could only afford to spend a few weeks of their time on a military campaign, because they should return to their fields as soon as possible. The interruption of everyday working life could ruin these soldier-farmers, who traditionally formed the troops' base. As a result, conflicts were short and were usually determined by a single clash of enemy forces.

At the end of the 5th century, Rome was competing with Etruscans and Greeks in central Italy. In these years, the Etruscans were defeated from time to time by Carthaginians, Greeks and Celts, and started to lose their influence on the area north of Rome. And in 390, the Celts from the north invaded their territories. The Romans intervened but were severely defeated in the Tiber valley, at the confluence with the River Allia, on July 18^th 390. From that moment on, this will be the “Dies Alliensis”, that is an “unfortunate day”. Clashing for the first time with a large unconventional army, the legions found themselves too slow and heavy to cope with agile, fast, sword-armed troops.

After this defeat, the city, which did not have strong fortifications, remained open and defenceless; the Gauls occupied it but renounced to seize the stronghold of the Capitol. The invaders, led by King Brenno, were content to be paid a large sum of money to withdraw from Rome. "Vae Victis”,  woe to the losers, King Brenno said when the Romans argued about the amount of gold they should pay to have the Celts leave the city. But even with this defeat, Rome increased its prestige, as it had been the only city to force the Gauls to withdraw from a location that had already been in their hands.

This military disaster severely shook the Romans, and many historians believe that the reforms to prevent a future one set them on the road to military superiority. The genius of Roman military commanders was their ability to learn from their opponents and adapt their techniques and their technology to suit their purposes.

From 389 on, Rome had formed a League with the other Latin cities, by which it managed to keep them under its complete control, and in 360, it had defeated the Etruscan town of Veio after a long struggle and extended its influence to southern Etruria. But, in 340, the Latins rebelled. Rome crushed the Latin revolt and forced the Latins to sign a new alliance: the faithful cities were rewarded with admission to Roman citizenship, the others remained formally independent. From now on, the Latins will become an integral part of the Roman State. Latin cities had no relations with each other, but only with Rome; this was the first application of the famous motto “divide et impera” (divide and rule).

Meanwhile, in 366 Plebeians got the chance to become consuls, then other offices will be accessible. Also, plebiscites, that is, the decisions of the Assembly of the plebeians, were granted legal value.

Now the Romans turned south. First, from 343 to 341, they fought the Samnites in what is called the 1st Samnite war. Later on, they extended their influence on Campania and in 327, they occupied Naples and forced it to an alliance. From 326 to 304, Rome was once again at war with the Samnites. The Consuls, who had entered Samnite territory in a region unknown to them, were surrounded in the Caudina valley and had to surrender. It is the famous episode of the so-called “Caudine Forks”: Romans had to hand over all weapons and 600 hostages and pass below a wooden trunk as a sign of defeat. But after some years of peace, Romans resumed war with the Samnites and with the Etruscans, who were now allies: in 310, they defeated the Etruscans and then the Samnites, who demanded peace.

From 298 to 290, Rome and the Samnites fought the 3rd and final war. The Samnites had again allied with the Etruscans, the Celts, the Sabini, the Lucani, Umbrians, practically all of Italy except the Greeks. But in 295 in northern Umbria, the Romans defeated the army of the allied enemies in the so-called “battle of the nations". Following this defeat, the Etruscans agreed to make peace. Five years later, so did the Samnites. And, between 285 and 282, the Romans conquered the territory of the Galli Senoni in the north. Now, almost all Etruscan cities recognized the supremacy of Rome and lost their independence. With the end of Etruscan power, Rome now controlled the whole of central Italy. The final step to the conquest of the Italian peninsula was the war against the Greek city of Taras, nowadays Taranto.

This leads us into Greek territory. In the 9^th and 8^th centuries BC, trade and the search for raw materials, especially metals, had brought the ancient Greeks to the shores of southern Italy and Sicily. This had led to permanent settlements, which then had turned into independent city-states, and these cities had developed their own distinctive culture and identity within the Greek world. Many aspects of Greek culture, especially writing and artistic styles, were transmitted to local communities in Italy, especially the Etruscans. Southern Italy and Sicily, which the Romans called Magna Graecia (Great Greece), were home to some of the wealthiest communities in the Greek world. You can see the best examples of Greek art and architecture in some extraordinary archaeological sites, such as Paestum, near Naples, and Agrigento in Sicily.

Paestum, which was once called Poseidonia, was founded in the 7^th century BC by Greek colonists from Sybaris, then it fell under the control of the Lucanians and later of Rome. Walls of almost 5 Km encircled the city, these walls still surround the urban core, and their height could be up to 7 mt. Paestum is famous for its three Doric temples, still in excellent condition - so much so that they are considered unique exemplars of the architecture of Magna Graecia. The three temples were built between 550 and 460 BC, using brown-tinted local limestone. The oldest is the Temple of Hera 1, also known as the Temple of Neptune. Then, we have the Temple of Athena, and finally, the Temple of Hera II, the best-preserved: the facades have 6 fluted columns and the long sides 14. Inside, a double row of slim Doric columns divided the cella into three aisles and once supported a ridged roof of wood and tiles.

Further south, on the shores of Sicily facing Africa, in an almost enchanted valley full of almond trees, the Valley of the Temples in Agrigento is the most impressive group of monuments of Hellenic origin in Sicily. The eight temples in the valley all date from the 5^th century BC - the golden age of the Greeks in Sicily. The majority of the temples are constructed from local sandstone and tufa rock. Inside the sanctuaries, a deity statue was on display flanked by a colonnade of columns on three sides.

Except one, all temples are based on the classical Doric style of architecture and are similar to temples and buildings built during the Golden Age of Athens. The best-preserved temple is the Temple of Concordia, dating back to 420 BC, it was named after the Roman god of Concordia, but it was most likely dedicated originally to a Greek god. It is regarded as one of the most remarkable surviving temples in the Doric style. Situated on a set of steps, it has many well-preserved fluted columns that are 6.5 meters high. Among the others, you may admire the Temple of Olympian Zeus (Jupiter), which was built to thank Zeus for the Agrigentines’ victory over the Carthaginians in 480 BC. Here are the famous atlases, some gigantic statues with a human shape, once used as columns or pilasters.

Back to Rome, the cities of Magna Graecia, which were increasingly threatened by the expansion of the Italic peoples, turned towards Rome as a natural ally. In 285, the towns of Turii, Locri and Reggio asked Rome to defend them from a local population, the Lucanians. But the Greek city of Taras, then the main centre of Magna Graecia, felt threatened by this interference in its sphere of influence. In the same year, a small Roman naval team penetrated the Gulf of Taranto to test Taras’ defences, and the Tarantine fleet attacked it and half-destroyed it. War broke out between Rome and Taras, and the Greeks asked for the help of Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, a region north of Greece.

Pyrrhus landed in Taras with a strong army, including 20 war elephants, and clashed with the Romans at Heraclea, close to Matera, in 280. He defeated them, as the Roman cavalry was no match for the cavalry of the Greeks and Romans were not trained to defend themselves from the assaults of the elephants. But Pyrrus’ losses were just slightly lower than the Romans’. Rome and its allies could easily replace their losses by enlisting more soldiers among the allied cities, unlike Pyrrhus, who was far from his homeland.

In 279, the king of Epirus clashed for a second time with the Romans, near Foggia: Pyrrhus won, yes, but once again it was a "Pyrrhus’ victory", with so many losses that, according to Pyrrus himself, “another victory like this and I’ll be lost”. In fact, to avoid the 3^rd battle, he preferred to enter into peace negotiations with the Romans. He had not foreseen that, after two serious defeats, Rome would not surrender.

In 278, Pyrrhus was called by Syracuse and landed in Sicily with the secret goal of creating a kingdom that would include Sicily, taking it from the Carthaginians and Southern Italy. So, facing this new enemy, the Carthaginians proposed the Romans an alliance. The Romans were granted the right to intervene freely anywhere in the Italian peninsula, and Carthage would not oppose them. For the first time, the Treaty constituted the recognition of Rome as a great power.

In 275, Pyrrhus was forced to return to the continent by a revolt of the Greek cities of Sicily; in the last battle near Benevento, the Romans beat him and forced him to embark back for Epirus. Three years later, Taras surrendered.

The defeat of Pyrrhus meant that the Roman infantry could defeat the strongest armies of the time, trained on the model of the Macedonian army of Alexander the Great and led by the best commanders. Now, Rome was the new ruler of the maritime trade in the low Adriatic and could deal on an equal footing with the most powerful states of the Mediterranean. The Romans extended their influence to several cities in Magna Graecia, where they placed their contingents. In 312, they began the construction of the Appian Way, the Regina Viarum, the Queen of the Ways from Rome to Capua, under the direction of the magistrate Appius Claudius. The Appian way was then extended to Brindisi and Taras, and on it marched the settlers who will romanize Benevento, Brindisi and many other Greek cities. The Romanization of Italy had begun.

Obviously, the Carthaginians were alarmed. This solidarity of interests between the Romans and their new allies, their common aspirations for maritime expansion, clashed with Carthaginians’ interests. This rivalry would turn soon into open war.